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Abstract 
 
Recent work has called for more research to be carried out exploring how professional projects 
develop in conjunction with wider processes of institutional change. We respond to these calls here 
by analysing the way in which tax professionals have responded to a major disruption at the field 
level. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s action plan on Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting has proposed far reaching reforms in an attempt to bring corporate tax 
practice into line with changing moral boundaries in society. Through a combination of 
documentary analysis, participant observation and qualitative interviews, this paper shows how tax 
professionals negotiate changing moral imperatives. In doing so, the paper enhances our 
understanding of tax practice and contributes to extant literature on professionalization and 
institutional change in three principal ways. Firstly, we show how exogenous field-level changes 
afford professional groups opportunities for strategic repositioning. Secondly, we illustrate how 
different professional factions are differentially affected by processes of institutional change, 
distinguishing between in-house tax professionals and those working in public practice. Thirdly, 
we demonstrate how this strategic repositioning is made possible by the skillful deployment of the 
technical-cognitive resources of professional groups.  
 
Keywords: Taxation, Corporations, Professionals, Institutional Change, Professionalization  
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Professional repositioning during times of institutional change: the case of tax practitioners 
and changing moral boundaries  
 
Introduction 
Recently, international taxation has attracted a growing level of attention from government policy 
makers who are concerned about the income shifting activities of multinational corporations. In 
particular, policy makers have expressed concerns about legal - but controversial - accounting 
practices such as transfer pricing1 that permit income shifting to low tax jurisdictions. These 
concerns are especially pronounced where intellectual property is involved because of the 
difficulties associated with valuing intangibles. As a response to these concerns, in 2013 the 
Organization for Co-operation and Development (OECD) initiated its Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan, which is specifically directed at modernizing the international tax 
system (OECD: 2013)2. The final BEPS package of 15 action items was released on October 15, 
2015 for discussion by the G20 Finance Ministers (Appendix 1). 
In addition to attracting the attention of government policy-makers, media revelations 
about the tax behaviour of several high profile multinational corporations have also antagonized 
the general tax-paying public. This is increasingly having an effect on tax practice that arises 
from outside the traditional tax system, potentially diluting some of the power wielded by tax 
executives identified in prior research (Mulligan and Oats, 2016). For example, in 2012, a UK 
consumer-driven Twitter campaign “Try Another Cup” targeted Starbucks for its efforts in 
                                                 
1 While transfer pricing is a standard accounting technique which has importance beyond tax, 
over or understating transfer prices can shift income between tax jurisdictions resulting in a tax 
benefit. 
2 The BEPs initiative was the result of an increasing concern over the last decade of the tax 
avoidance activities of multinational enterprises and tax competition between states.  The 
European Union was an early leader in this area with its “harmful tax” initiative. A criticism of 
the BEPs project is that it is not designed to provide meaningful change in the corporate income 
tax system but rather arose to appease societal concerns. 
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shifting income out of the UK to lower tax jurisdictions, propelling taxation to a prominent place 
on the corporation’s CSR agenda (Shaheen, 2012). Ultimately, Starbucks responded to this public 
outcry in December 2015 by paying £8.1m in tax to the UK tax authorities, almost as much as it 
had paid to the same body in the previous 14 years combined (The Guardian, 15th December, 
20153). Starbucks was the symptom of a much larger malaise concerning tax transparency, tax 
avoidance and tax policy, issues that the OECD had been working on for several decades. After 
the systemic jolts caused by events such as the Enron collapse, the 2007-8 financial crisis and 
movements such as Occupy Wall Street, these tax issues started to become intelligible in the 
context of widespread mistrust of big business and financial institutions (see Appendix 2 for a 
timeline of key events in the development of BEPS). In part, this public ire over tax was fuelled 
by government investigations such as the US Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations examination of the tax activities of Apple. However, public interest was also 
motivated by extensive media questioning of the tax-paying behaviour of major corporations, 
coverage of which has increased significantly in recent years. In fact, the recent report of the 
International Fiscal Association (IFA, 2017) notes that several of the IFA branch reports (from 
the countries participating in BEPS) identified negative media reaction to multinational tax abuse 
as fuelling the OECD and G20 commitment to the BEPS process. Christians (2013) further 
highlights the way in which tax transparency advocates have mobilised the “peer pressure” effect 
that arises from the OECD community. 
These developments have highlighted how the work of tax practitioners is socially 
consequential. As a result, we believe it is important to adequately conceptualize the work that 
tax practitioners do in the context of changing moral boundaries. Taking a theoretical approach in 
                                                 
3 Rob Davies, ‘Starbucks pays UK corporation tax of £8.1m.’, theguardian.com accessed 22nd 
September, 2015. 
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which tax is viewed as an institution and tax professionals as “morally significant actors” 
(Suddaby, 2013: 381), in this paper we use the case of BEPS to contribute to literature on 
institutional change and professional repositioning in three principal ways. First, we extend prior 
research that shows how institutional change affords opportunities for organizations to 
strategically enhance their position within fields (Kodeih and Greenwood, 2014). We show here 
how institutional change affords professional groups similar opportunities in line with DiMaggio 
(1991). Second, we examine the reciprocal relationship between institutionalization and 
professionalization as suggested by Suddaby and Viale (2011). Specifically, Suddaby and Viale 
(2011) call for more research that draws attention to the way in which field-level changes impact 
differentially upon different professionals. We respond directly to that call here by showing the 
ways in which corporate in-house tax professionals and their external tax advisors conceive of 
BEPS in quite different ways. By extension, we explore the symbolic boundaries (Lamont, 1992) 
that these two professional factions draw in order to distinguish themselves from each other. 
Third, we illustrate the ways in which professionals use technical-cognitive resources in skillful 
ways as part of an overarching attempt to enhance the professional project of tax. Specifically, we 
show how tax accountants exhibit “entrepreneurial social skill” (Suddaby et al, 2016: 228), 
adapting their technical expertise to reflexively mediate between organizations and the wider 
court of public opinion in ways that are beneficial to themselves.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the following two sections, we 
examine current tax research and argue that wider literature on transnational governance and 
institutional change offer fruitful ways via which to frame current tax practice and different 
groups of tax professionals. A subsequent section outlines in detail the BEPS project and 
considers its main objectives. We then outline the research methods employed in the study. The 
findings are then presented in accordance with the various ways in which in-house tax 
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professionals and those who are external advisors are seen as responding to BEPS. Finally, we 
discuss the main contributions that our analysis permits us to make and conclude by suggesting 
directions for further research. 
 
Tax as a social practice 
One readily identifiable stream of tax literature identifies the attitudes and dispositions of 
individual taxpayers, largely theorising these from psychological or behavioural perspectives. 
Such work might, for example, explore the ethical beliefs and social norms that shape tax 
compliance or avoidance decisions (Alm and Torger, 2011; Blanthorne and Kaplan, 2008; 
Kaplan et al., 1988; Kirchler et al., 2006; Shafer and Simmons, 2008, 2011) or look at the roles of 
trust, persuasion and cooperation in tax compliance activities (Murphy 2004, 2008). Further work 
explores the specific relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and aggressive tax 
planning, hotly debating whether the two go hand in hand or not (see, for example, Dowling, 
2014; Muller and Kolk, 2015; Lanis and Richardson, 2013; Ylonen and Laine, 2015).  
A second readily identifiable stream of research on tax, often to be found in the wider 
social sciences rather than in the accounting literature, views tax more as a social practice, deeply 
embedded within wider socio-economic structures and with welfare implications (Carter et al., 
2013; Martin, 2015; Morgan and Prasad, 2009; Palan et al., 2010; Roberts and Bobek, 2004; 
Sikka & Willmott, 2010). Regulation is a recurring theme in this stream of literature, with 
Genschel and Schwarz (2011) also highlighting the way in which countries engage in “wasteful 
competition for mobile economic assets and activities through tax reductions” (339). Relatedly, a 
number of studies have looked at the interactions between various combinations of taxpayers, tax 
advisors, tax authorities and tax lobbyists in order to reveal the politically contested nature of the 
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tax terrain (Addison and Mueller, 2015; Currie et al., 2015; Gracia and Oats, 2012; Kentikelenis 
and Seabrooke, 2017; Seabrooke and Wigan, 2016).  
Overall, there is a growing body of social science looking at tax, which has helped to shed 
light on individual approaches to tax behaviour as well as situating tax within wider social 
science frameworks. However, each of these broad approaches to tax research has its 
deficiencies. Literature looking at tax from a psychological or behavioural perspective ignores 
wider social structures and influences as well as evincing a reluctance to engage tax practitioners 
directly and elicit their own viewpoints on major institutional initiatives. Literature depicting tax 
as a social practice is much better in terms of highlighting the ways in which tax behaviour is 
enmeshed with wider organizational, institutional, political and societal phenomena, but tends to 
adopt a more macro perspective, telling us little about what tax actors are actually doing on the 
ground, how such actors understand what they do and whether they might be able to act 
otherwise.  
In order to understand how tax actors are responding to manifest societal disquiet over 
corporate tax avoidance and major international initiatives such as BEPS, another approach is 
required that can bridge aspects of structure with aspects of agency; firstly, tax needs to be 
conceived firmly as a social practice, paying attention to the way in which everyday tax practices 
are interwoven with societal, institutional and political norms and pressures; secondly, 
engagement with tax actors directly is of paramount importance if we are to understand how such 
norms and pressures successfully infiltrate or otherwise impact the world of taxpayers and their 
advisors.  
Studies more in this vein include Boll (2014), Morrell and Tuck (2014) and Mulligan and 
Oats (2016). For example, Mulligan and Oats (2016) usefully identify the powerful role that tax 
executives play in shaping the external tax environment, subtly exercising their power at micro, 
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meso and macro levels. Boll (2014) focuses on the actual tax practices of people within 
organizations, characterizing tax as a “distributed action” (293), meaning that tax behaviour 
cannot be understood by reference to the individual viewpoints of tax actors alone but needs to be 
understood in the context of the wider network relations within which actors find themselves. 
Morrell and Tuck (2014) show the importance of dominant plots in assisting accounting 
professionals in making sense of tax’s complex governance environment. They provide a more 
nuanced perspective in understanding the relationship between corporate taxpayers and tax 
authorities by highlighting that corporate taxpayers are not simply ‘villains’ but must make 
decisions in a complex environment, an environment where tax authorities often implausibly cast 
themselves as false ‘heroes’. 
The above studies usefully attempt to integrate individual experience (agency) with wider 
external pressures (structures). Moreover, they do so in a way that embraces the complexity of 
tax practice and its surrounding institutional environment. However, a number of limitations 
characterise such work. Firstly, empirically, the datasets from which these studies are drawn are 
limited in terms of what they might tell us about current tax practice. Mulligan and Oats (2016) 
draw on data from 2005 and Morrell and Tuck (2014) on interviews undertaken between 2001 
and 2007. Initiatives such as BEPS and recent shifts in public opinion suggest that tax practice 
might have moved on since these times. Mulligan and Oats (2016) focus primarily on in-house 
tax professionals rather than those working in public practice and therefore offer limited insights 
into the ways in which institutional change differentially impacts upon different professional 
factions (Suddaby and Viale, 2011). Additionally, Boll’s (2014) study draws from a limited 
sample of 12 carpenters, plumbers, bookkeepers and restaurateurs, a far cry from the higher 
profile world of large corporations and Big 4 tax advisers that the BEPS discourse is targeting.  
 
8 
 
Tax professionals as reflexive agents 
The above review of the literature suggests that more empirical work looking at the experience of 
tax professionals, both in-house and externally, to these recent institutional and societal changes 
is therefore necessary. Such work is important because it can enhance our understanding of how 
professional groups attempt to reposition themselves during times of institutional change. 
DiMaggio’s (1991) classic work on museum professionals described this professional group as 
skilful social actors who exhibited a “dual consciousness” (268), operating conservatively at the 
organizational level while initiating field-level changes that served to enhance their own status. 
Thus, professionals often acquire both an awareness of their institutional environments as well as 
“a degree of skill or competence in managing or manipulating that environment” (Suddaby, 2013: 
383). Suddaby et al (2016) elsewhere describe this awareness of the constraints and opportunities 
present in surrounding social structures, and the ability to skilfully take advantage of these, as 
‘reflexivity’.  For example, museum workers in the US in the early 1900s were successful in 
shaping the institutional environment within which they operated in their own image, creating 
field-level organizations that encouraged an understanding of art as something for the 
consumption of the general public rather than the privilege of societal elites (DiMaggio, 1991). In 
this respect, the museum professionals used public welfare and education arguments to 
consciously4 enhance their own position and status as key buffers between their organizations and 
                                                 
4 It is worth nuancing this, as some professional actors consciously do the work at the level 
of the organizational field that leads to enhanced status, while others express little social 
skill at the organizational level, merely taking advantage of the field level shifts that are 
enacted by a minority of professional actors (DiMaggio, 1991: 288). Greenwood et al (2017) 
also note that different actors will exhibit different degrees of strategic behaviour in 
situations of institutional complexity, suggesting that individuals can be positioned on a 
continuum of embedded discretion. Overall, therefore, some actors will be more conscious 
of attempts to enhance professional projects, while others will less consciously reap the 
benefits of such strategies. It is not always possible to distinguish the one from the other.  
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the wider institutional environment within which they operated (McPherson and Sauder, 2013). 
In Bourdieusian terms, they reflexively displayed a ‘private interest in the public interest’ (2005). 
For the purposes of the present study, it would be of interest to know to what extent tax 
professionals are taking advantage of changes in their institutional environment to enhance their 
own professional position, potentially using morality as a symbolic resource in the same way as 
DiMaggio’s (1991) museum professionals did in the early 1900s. Suddaby (2013) notes that 
professions are often at the forefront of diffusing practices that are seen to be right and proper.  
Suddaby and Viale (2011) build upon DiMaggio’s (1991) work by describing professional 
projects as endogenous mechanisms of institutional change. That is, professional groups are 
constantly altering organizational fields and institutional environments through their actions in 
ways that affect other groups, but also in ways that alter their own position within the social 
space more broadly. One key resource that professionals draw upon in order to position and 
reposition themselves in the social space is, according to Suddaby and Viale (2011), social 
capital, or what Fligstein (2001) refers to as ‘social skill’ or ‘the ability to engage others in 
collective action’ (106).  
We suggest that, in addition to social skill or social capital, that professionals also draw 
upon their resources of technical expertise in order to endogenise institutional change. This might 
be particularly true of tax professionals whose work is often highly complex, involving multiple 
cross-border transactions that take place within the context of opaque and contested regulatory 
environments. Unlike other financial professionals such as auditors whose careers tend to 
advance by becoming entrepreneurial deal makers and distancing themselves from the realm of 
technical work which is delegated to subordinates (Spence and Carter, 2014), tax accountants 
continue to deliver technical briefs even during advanced stages of their careers. The complexity 
of tax practice is such that tax professionals can be seen in the vein of Viale et al (2017) as 
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“holders of crucial know-how” (p.26). Therefore, understanding how tax professionals employ 
their technical and cognitive resources can reveal the extent to which technical expertise is 
successfully deployed in processes that confer group advantages (Power, 2003; Suddaby et al., 
2016). In attempting to understand this, our approach responds directly to a recent call by Viale et 
al (2017): 
“[T]here is a dramatic need for more studies analyzing resources embedded in the social 
skills of professionals and experts, and the role of these resources in the constitution of 
professional boundaries” (p.30).  
 
In particular, it is  of interest to explore the ways in which the technical-cognitive basis of tax 
work adapts to, or resists, the introduction of new moral imperatives into the tax field. In 
institutional terms, the introduction of a new moral ‘logic’ into the tax field potentially conflicts 
with a well-established commercial ‘logic’ of tax minimisation, thereby exacerbating a pre-
existing institutional complexity within the field. Recent work on institutional complexity points 
out that “[m]ore work is needed to unpack how local actors mediate institutional demands and the 
requirements of day-to-day organizational activity” (McPherson and Sauder, 2013, p.166). The 
present study responds to this by looking at how tax professionals seek to take advantage of 
institutional complexity through the reconstitution of professional boundaries.  
 Additionally, existing tax research has failed to keep apace with wider developments in 
governance and regulation that now assume an essentially transnational nature (Arnold, 2005; 
Suddaby et al, 2007). In various spheres, from accounting regulation to forestry certification, 
there has been noted an “increasing formalization, structuration, codification, standardization and 
depersonalization of the rules of the game in the transnational space” (Djelic and Quack, 2003: 
5). These developments have witnessed the State become displaced as the main actor of 
regulation, instead being one among many and an increasing role of epistemic communities with 
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shared interests and expertise, such as professional groups (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006). 
A key aspect of this shift to transnational governance is the increasing significance of ‘soft law’ 
instead of binding regulation. Bodies such as the OECD, who can be understood as one of the 
most important post-war transnational organizations (Djelic and Quack, 2003), need to be 
understood in this context, as ‘agenda-setters’ rather than regulators per se (Jacobsson and 
Sahlin-Andersson, 2006). The degree to which the BEPS project represents a very significant 
extension of transnational governance, cannot be overstated. In this regard, the International 
Fiscal Association notes that: 
The BEPS project has witnessed the transition of global tax governance from the OECD’s 
province of the developed north to global fora, wherever those fora may be housed 
institutionally (IFA, 2017: 21). 
 
For this reason, the BEPS project serves as an ideal context within which to explore how tax 
professionals respond to this wider shift towards transnational governance, perhaps exploiting the 
declining role of the nation-state in various ways in order to position themselves more 
strategically in the market for transnational corporate tax advice. Extant research on tax, which 
has only begun to view tax as a social practice, has yet to situate tax professionals and the advice 
that they disburse within transnational parameters. Such an intellectual enterprise is essential if 
we are to understand how tax professionals, both in-house and externally, operate in the first 
instance, and how they might be more effectively regulated in the second.  
In summary, although emerging research has begun to view tax as a social practice, there 
is a tendency for this literature to empirically privilege either the micro level activities of the tax 
practitioner or the macro context of the politico-regulatory structures within with tax practices are 
situated.  More work could be done that simultaneously considers the extent to which tax 
professionals both shape and are shaped by their institutional environments. The present study 
seeks to do just this and, in so doing, purports to make a number of contributions to literature on 
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the professions and institutional change. Firstly, we demonstrate the way in which individual 
professional groups take advantage of/actively create institutional change in order to enhance 
their own position in the social space. Kodeih and Greenwood (2014) point out that institutional 
change affords organizations opportunities to strategically and intentionally enhance their 
position within organizational fields. We focus here on professional groups rather than 
organizations per se and thus draw attention to the way in which institutional change – in the 
form of both changing moral imperatives at the societal level and BEPS related initiatives at the 
field level - and professional projects co-evolve. Secondly, we draw attention to the way in which 
professional groups are internally divided and how those divisions – e.g. between in-house tax 
professionals and their external advisors - can become more demarcated during times of 
institutional change. This follows on directly from Suddaby and Viale’s (2011) call for more 
research “that addresses the various ways in which field-level processes of institutionalization 
attend to some characteristics of individual professionals and not others" (431). Differences 
between different professional factions might be evident from the different demands or 
opportunities that institutional pressures for change create for each, or from the symbolic 
boundaries (Lamont, 1992) that one professional faction might articulate between themselves and 
the other professional faction. Thirdly, we explore the ways in which technical-cognitive 
resources are mobilised and enmeshed with moral imperatives as part of professional 
repositioning projects. This extends Suddaby and Viale’s (2011) work which emphasises the 
importance of social skill in advancing professional projects.  
 
BEPS and ‘soft’ law 
As noted earlier, the BEPS project represents one of the most far-reaching and dramatic 
developments in transnational governance in recent history. In developing the project, the OECD 
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expressly sought to include non-members in the process in order to enhance the legitimacy of the 
outcomes. In total, 100 different jurisdictions, accounting for 93 percent of the world’s Gross 
Domestic Product, are now included in the process (OECD, 2017). That this was a remarkable 
success in promoting transnational governance can be seen in the comments of the International 
Fiscal Association in its recent analysis of the BEPS project. Drawing on reports from its 
branches based in the BEPS participating countries, the IFA concluded that the project 
represented a shift in tax governance from the OECD itself to a set of truly global fora (IFA, 
2017).  
The BEPS project seeks to provide an internationally accepted moral basis for appropriate 
sharing of tax revenues between countries. This is an explicitly normative agenda.  According to 
the OECD 
addressing BEPS is critical for countries and must be done in a timely manner, not 
least to prevent the existing consensus-based international tax framework from 
unravelling, which would increase uncertainty for businesses at a time when cross 
border investments are more necessary than ever. (OECD 2014d: 3)  
 
We provide an overview of the BEPS Actions measures in Appendix 1 and a summary of the key 
dates and events in the elaboration of BEPS in Appendix 2. Here, it is sufficient to note that the 
objective of BEPS is to change both the way that multinationals and tax professionals think about 
tax planning, and the ways in which sovereign governments implement and enforce tax policy. 
Such objectives are evocative of Suddaby and Viale’s (2011) contention that professional 
projects are now more closely interconnected with transnational arena than with initiatives arising 
at the level of the nation-state.  
Questions remain, however, about the extent to which the OECD can force sovereign 
nations to follow newly developed norms and, in turn, whether it can truly disrupt entrenched tax 
minimisation logics. As an agenda-setter rather than a regulator (Jacobsson and Sahlin-
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Andersson, 2006) the OECD has no formal authority to institute or enforce rules in any sovereign 
nation.  However, this is not to say that the OECD did not have regulative intent in the BEPS 
project, merely that it relies on its authoritative expertise rather than its ability to implement 
sanctions. In fact, legal scholars have noted that the OECD exercises a form of ‘soft law’, 
whereby nations comply with OECD guidance by expectation rather than by legal obligation 
(Christians, 2007). Consistent with this observation, the OECD expressly stated in its BEPS 
reports that it anticipates that national governments will implement the proposals of the BEPS 
project via domestic tax law: 
They are soft law legal instruments. They are not legally binding but there is an 
expectation that they will be implemented accordingly by countries that are part of the 
consensus. (OECD 2015a: 5) 
 
The ostensibly soft law nature of BEPS notwithstanding, membership of the OECD and 
participation in the BEPS process carries with it certain expectations, including compliance with 
the BEPS directives5. Of particular interest is the adoption of minimum standards, the very 
rhetoric of which is strongly suggestive of regulative action. With regard to enforcement, the 
OECD’s FAQ document directly addresses this issue through the issue of monitoring: 
Monitoring the implementation of the BEPS measures includes targeted monitoring of the 
minimum standards on treaty shopping and on dispute resolution, the application of the 
criteria on harmful tax practices as well as the implementation of the country-by-country 
reporting requirements. Monitoring will also focus on what countries have done to 
implement the BEPS recommendations and the measurement of the impact of BEPS and 
BEPS countermeasures. (OECD 2015a: 6) 
 
                                                 
5 In the final BEPS package all OECD and G-20 countries have committed to minimum standards 
in four areas; treaty shopping, country by country reporting, fighting harmful tax practices, and 
improving dispute resolution. In addition, in the areas of tax treaties and transfer pricing existing 
standards have been updated and in the areas of hybrid mismatch arrangements and interest 
deductibility countries have agreed on a general policy direction. Finally, in the areas of 
mandatory disclosure initiatives and controlled foreign corporations the package provides 
guidance on best practices (OECD, 2015a).   
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This regulative impetus is further evident in the BEPS Action 15: Develop a Multilateral 
Instrument (OECD 2014c: 17). The report on Action 15 is directed at creating one single 
instrument that would override all current bilateral tax treaties between countries; in essence, 
countries adopting the treaty would have forfeited, on some level, their own tax sovereignty, 
implying that transnational pronouncements often take precedence over national initiatives 
(Suddaby et al, 2007). On June 7, 2017, some 67 countries signed this instrument and others are 
expected to join in the coming months (OECD, 2017).   
 While provisions such as these point to how BEPS displays a regulative intent, a closer 
examination of these provisions also reveals a strong moral basis behind their design and 
function. As noted by the IFA “[n]one of the minimum standards affected substantive tax law 
rules, which were relegated to recommendations and best practices” (2017: 34). The minimum 
standards involve developing new review processes (administration), treaty provisions consistent 
with existing provisions of many countries and mechanisms for effective and timely resolution of 
disputes (both treaty practice). Even where new laws are introduced, such as in the case of 
country-by-country reporting requirements, these relate to improved transparency through greater 
disclosure, not changing existing tax laws. Therefore, while BEPS is clearly having regulatory 
consequences, it also relies upon the moral cajoling of both countries and corporations.  
While, on the one hand, BEPS implies a loss of State power, on the other there is 
evidence that individual States will continue to act opportunistically, albeit under the guise of 
enhancing global welfare. For example, the International Fiscal Association (2017) report 
identifies significant differences between countries with respect to their views on BEPS 
outcomes. Of particular interest is the IFA’s observation that countries most supportive of BEPS 
are the OECD’s core members. The IFA suggests that these countries “viewed BEPS as a means 
of ‘coaxing (with the leverage of peer pressure) other countries to replicate their own domestic 
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policy preferences” (p. 19). This interpretation of BEPS is quite different from the more 
harmonious global consensus perspective being promoted by the OECD (see for example, 
OECD, 2017).   
What does this all mean for individual tax professionals? Overall, the BEPS initiative has 
instigated a series of imperatives that seek to disrupt the way in which corporate tax practice is 
undertaken. There are clearly regulative imperatives in the form of proposed changes to laws and 
mechanisms outlined to enforce these. Beyond regulation, there are also normative imperatives 
directed at changing the moral standards as to what constitutes legitimate tax practice. It is in this 
respect that the transnational project of BEPS comes into direct contact with the professional 
project of tax, which has grappled with the meaning of the morality of tax minimisation for many 
decades. For example, Christians (2013) notes one leading executive is on record as stating that 
“morality has entered the tax lexicon” (p. 297) as far back as 2006. Anecdotally, the OECD 
(2017) asserts that there is evidence of increased board oversight of tax planning activity and that 
multinationals are responding to BEPS by “changing the nature of their tax planning 
arrangements to ensure alignment between the location of their value-creating activities and the 
location of profits for tax purposes” (p. 6). This shift in thinking is precisely what BEPS hopes to 
promote.  
However, in spite of this attempt to provide greater clarity in what has hitherto been an 
incredibly complex space, the BEPS initiative has not reduced the room that tax professionals as 
a whole have for manoeuvre. Not only have tax professionals been involved in the elaboration of 
BEPS itself at the field level, at the organizational level they find themselves as key mediators 
between their organizations and society per se (McPherson and Sauder, 2013). Further, as Power 
(2009) notes, rules-based systems provide greater cognitive comfort for professional actors, so it 
is unclear whether practitioners will embrace the new way of thinking proposed by BEPS – 
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which is, at least in part, principles based - or will simply revert to superficial compliance with 
the rules. Either way, the BEPS project presents us with an ideal opportunity for increasing our 
understanding of tax as a social practice and for identifying the ways in which tax professionals 
as reflexive actors respond to transnational institutional change. 
 
Methods 
In studying tax professionals as institutional actors, we employ multiple methods (Muzio and 
Faulconbridge, 2013) to analyse the field in which they operate and how institutional changes 
within the field - such as greater scrutiny by the public and government policy-makers and 
actions such as the OECD’s BEPS action plan - have disrupted tax practice. We engaged 
practitioners directly by conducting semi-structured interviews in four countries; Canada, the 
United States, the United Kingdom and China. In total, we conducted 32 semi-structured 
interviews with tax professionals working either in public practice or as in-house tax and finance 
executives, with one interviewee working for a national tax authority. 16 of these interviews took 
place in Canada, 11 in the US, one in the UK and four in China. These interviews included a 
follow up interview with one of our interviewees from a Big 4 firm to update our understanding 
of reactions to recent BEPS developments and the role and influence of tax professionals in 
constructing the final BEPS recommendations. The sample contains a balance of in-house tax 
professionals working in corporations and external advisers working in public practice, thus 
permitting insights to be drawn regarding the differential impact of institutional change on 
professional sub-groups (Suddaby and Viale, 2011). Canada and the US were chosen as the 
primary empirical sites of the study because of the institutional differences between the two in 
terms of tax, and also because they share significant cross-border trade. The UK interview was 
done with a US subsidiary and so essentially forms part of the US sample. China was also chosen 
18 
 
for a limited number of interviews specifically because it is a non-OECD country, albeit one that 
attracts significant Foreign Direct Investment, and would provide some insight into how far 
reaching the BEPS initiative actually is.  
Our interview dataset covers tax professionals working in public practice and in-house in 
companies of various sizes and industries including companies in the business to business and the 
business to consumer spaces. Speaking with in-house tax professionals, in addition to those in 
public practice, provides highly relevant insights since these individuals have been shown to 
shape tax law and practices (Mulligan and Oats, 2016). Our interviewees were senior tax people 
in their organizations and included Vice-Presidents, Directors of Tax, CFOs with tax 
backgrounds in industry and Partners in public practice. These individuals had contact with 
senior executives and board members in their organizations or client firms, indicating that the tax 
function was often seen as a source of power and status within the organization (Mulligan and 
Oats, 2016). Characteristics and background information regarding interviewees and their 
organizations are outlined in Table 1.  
 
Please place Table 1 here 
 
This table presents information on interviewees and their organizations at a high level to disguise 
the identity of participants. The world of tax professionals is relatively small in comparison with, 
say, that of auditors, so greater detail might reveal the identities of participants, contravening both 
research ethics and assurances provided to participants.  
The interviews and participant observations took place between September 2013 and 
August 2015, a period during which BEPS was taking shape and companies were confronted with 
new and uncertain realities surrounding tax planning. The interviews allowed us to directly 
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understand how tax professionals experienced these new realities and constructed responses to 
them in an increasingly uncertain environment. An interview guide was used to direct the 
discussion and ensure consistency between the interviews as all authors were involved at various 
points in the process. Interviews explored a number of issues regarding the changing tax 
environment, including interviewees’ views on BEPS, the role of social responsibility in tax, 
interviewees’ perceptions of changes in their role or nature as tax professionals, organizational 
responses to these issues, changes to organizational tax planning and compliance processes, and 
relationships with local and international tax authorities. In broad terms, the interview guide 
permitted exploration of the way in which BEPS was impacting upon tax practice and how tax 
practitioners themselves, as individuals and as a group, were responding to various BEPS-related 
imperatives. Interviewees were probed to give specific examples of how their own work had 
changed in recent years and interviewers were particularly concerned to explore the extent to 
which tax professionals’ daily activities were more or less influenced by emerging and growing 
moral pressures from various quarters.  
These interviews were informed by our examination of a broad range of empirical 
material (Appendix 3), which allowed us to capture a wider understanding of the institutional 
environment tax professionals navigate. This material also provided an important background and 
context against which to conduct our interviews and assess the interview material. We began by 
analysing the emergence and evolution of BEPS, beginning with the OECD’s initial report on 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting issued on February 12, 2013 (OECD, 2013). This analysis 
provided a useful starting point to both engage with tax professionals and appreciate early 
expectations of shifts within the tax environment. During the period over which we conducted 
and analysed the interviews, we continually monitored the institutional environment surrounding 
BEPS and broader public concerns over the taxation of multinational companies.   
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During the study period, newspaper and tax practitioner journal articles were collected 
and examined to understand how BEPS and public concerns over tax responsibility more 
generally were changing the environment. Tax is an evolving body of knowledge and tax practice 
is influenced by political dynamics. These articles provided insight into public, government and 
corporate responses to recent tax issues and captured important interactions between these 
various groups over time. Additionally, more quantitative data sources in the form of surveys 
conducted by Deloitte (2014a, 2014b, 2015) were examined to corroborate and validate our 
interview data. Survey respondents included firm clients and contacts, numbering almost 600, 
from over 15 countries.  Survey questions examined areas such as reputational and governance 
concerns, development of organizational policies, impact on Boards of Directors, scrutiny and 
relations with tax authorities, changes in business operations, anticipation of legislative changes, 
and impact on the organization including its tax burden. Finally, two of the authors attended 
conferences and symposiums on BEPS at which speakers included tax partners, tax professionals 
and government officials, totalling 35 hours of participant observation. Attending these BEPS-
related conferences was very important in terms of understanding the collective sense of just how 
much BEPS is perceived as constituting a disruption to tax practice, as well as in highlighting the 
different symbolic boundaries that are drawn publicly between in-house tax professionals, 
external tax advisors, State actors and those working for the OECD itself.  
 
Professional repositioning in times of institutional change 
1. Reacting to BEPS 
In spite of recent disruptions to tax practice in the form of heightened public and regulatory 
concern over the tax strategies of corporations, many professionals continue to see their role as 
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pure tax minimization while remaining within the letter of the tax law. One US interviewee stated 
the case quite clearly as follows: 
the company’s job is to keep as much of its own money as possible … it should pay as 
little tax as possible without evading the law but within the means of whatever risk profile 
the company has for grey areas and therefore it’s the tax VP’s job to make sure that that 
happens and therefore it’s my job to help that tax VP … (P30, Tax Partner, 2015) 
 
There was a strong aversion to any suggestion that the tax professional think of tax minimization 
outside this framework and there was a sense that “doing the right thing” translated into 
compliance with the letter of the law. Many professionals felt it was the role of the government to 
make the laws and tax professionals simply had to remain on correct side of those laws. For 
example, another professional expressed frustration with any expectation to think beyond legal 
compliance.  
What does that mean – volunteering tax? You can’t function as a company – like our 
mission in our company is complying with the laws. You know, like be in full compliance 
with the laws. Don’t dick around and we tend not to, we don’t believe we dick around. In 
fact, our history, you know, when a government has half challenged us and we’ve gone to 
court we don’t lose very often and that’s not because we are sneaky lawyers and we’ve 
done fancy tricks. It’s because whatever those laws were, we did follow them and we 
were compliant.  (C4, Tax Executive, 2014)   
 
By constantly emphasising the need to comply with laws, tax professionals as a whole understand 
tax mainly as a rule driven process, with governments responsible for establishing the rules6, 
individual and corporate taxpayers responsible for following the rules, tax authorities responsible 
for ensuring the rules are followed or handing out sanctions for the failure to follow rules, and 
courts to adjudicate disputes over interpretation of the rules.  
 Rules therefore provide a compass for guiding tax professionals in their day-to-day 
activities. In fact, tax professionals see their duty as following the rules established by the state 
                                                 
6 Mulligan and Oats (2016) describe how the process to develop tax rules is subject to intense 
lobbying by multinational enterprises and tax advisors.   
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irrespective of whether they agree with those rules or not: 
Some may not like that a red light means that you’ve got to stop, you know, but that’s 
what you’ve got to do, you’ve got to stop at the red light. I think you do have a moral 
duty, as an American citizen, you have a responsibility to pay the tax under the system 
that we have. (P21, Tax Partner, 2014) 
 
Interviewees argued that social responsibility within tax was the responsibility of governments 
who establish the tax rules. Interviewees continually emphasized that current concerns over social 
responsibility within tax are traceable to the failure of governments to establish appropriate rules. 
In particular, they pointed to the need for regulatory solutions and actions on the part of 
governments to enforce regulations. 
So I get very annoyed by all this socially responsible business because tax is not up to tax 
payers. It is up to the governments to set the law. So the media should be directing their 
ire and their concerns at governments, not at large corporations. (C14, Tax Executive, 
2015) 
 
Aggressive tax planning was perceived by corporate interviewees as a product of Big 4 
accounting firms aggressively trying to make a market. For example, the following interviewee 
reflects back on the environment of the 1990s when Arthur Andersen were still in business: 
Accounting firms, particularly with sort of the Arthur Andersen move in like it was the 
mid-90s that they really began to turn [aggressive tax planning] into a business in a major 
way and focus on it and drive a pile of money on it. That to me was not a helpful 
development….Like I think that’s done a real disservice to sort of the whole practice of 
tax and tax communities and, again, the accounting firms would just go – they would be 
really mad at me to hear me say that but I’ve seen it. I’ve seen way too many – they come 
around here and try and sell some stuff and I look at them and I go I can’t believe you are 
selling this…It stinks and if everyone did it there would be no revenue left in Canada. 
(C4, Tax Executive, 2014) 
 
Another interviewee, now an in-house tax advisor but previously in public practice, offers similar 
reflections, emphasizing the ways in which tax professionals have taken advantage of complexity 
in tax legislation in order to push tax aggressiveness as a self-serving agenda: 
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I think it is probably more relevant to look at my fifteen years that I was in public practice 
and seeing some of the ideas and some of the scenarios that were bantered about and 
some of the plans that were very popular and put into place and, quite frankly, I had 
difficulty with a lot of the things that were being promoted because, and it’s not so much 
even that I thought they were morally wrong, I mean I just didn’t think that that was the 
intent of some of the legislation. I don’t think some of the products that were resulting 
from the interpretations were necessarily in line with what was the right, if you will, the 
right thing to do. (C2, Tax Executive, 2014) 
 
This interviewee, and others, describe a situation in which, starting from the early 1990s, tax 
professionals in (then) Big 5 firms essentially took advantage of byzantine tax rules in order to 
institutionalise a set of practices within multinational corporations that created additional high-
value work for themselves. Indeed, even in today’s climate of increased public scrutiny over tax 
planning, those working for external advisory companies continue to espouse more legalistic 
views on what is acceptable and what is not: 
So there are sometimes, and it’s both in the media, but I’ve heard it occasionally from the 
tax authorities as well, people shouldn’t be doing aggressive tax planning. I have no idea 
what that means. So either something is compliant with the law or it’s not compliant with 
the law. We know what tax evasion is and we’re not there, but beyond that what does 
aggressive tax planning mean? (P7, Tax Partner, 2014) 
 
In this respect, external advisors often seem to be much less intimidated by the BEPS pressures 
than their in-house counterparts, and more focused on the need to help their clients meet the new 
requirements. Presumably this is in part reflects the business opportunity presented by BEPS 
(which is certainly corroborated by the large amount of BEPS related promotional material now 
produced by Big 4 firms) whereas in-house tax professionals often express a real concern with 
regulatory compliance, whether BEPS related or not: 
I think the one thing it’s hitting us is with this new compliance stuff which is going to 
drive us all nuts. It’s, again, which I don’t think is going to be productive towards their 
goals but it’s going to put a burden on everybody to try and get them this data that’s going 
to make us so-called transparent and I think we are all really concerned about that. Like 
the ask for this stuff is going to be so huge but I’m not sure, you know, that train has left 
the station. (C4, Tax Executive, 2014) 
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Many in-house tax professionals wanted greater regulatory clarity, particularly in 
multijurisdictional situations where many tax professionals fear that tighter tax rules at the 
country level will lead to situations of double taxation. These in-house tax professionals 
expressed concerns that BEPS may not simply clarify rules but lead to even more rules, resulting 
in an even greater compliance burden, particularly Action 13: Guidance on Transfer Pricing and 
Country-by- Country Reporting (OECD, 2014b) requiring country by country reporting. Tax 
professionals tended to agree that they were more than willing to comply with such requirements 
but were clearly concerned how they might get such information since in some cases 
multinationals could have thousands of corporate entities. 
Overall, tax professionals as a whole are not of the view that the recent BEPS initiative 
has reduced complexity in professional work: they require high amounts of technical expertise in 
order to navigate and interpret the myriad rules that govern tax practice. Further, some expressed 
the view that this complexity has actually increased as a result of BEPS, thereby creating more 
opportunities for tax professionals in public practice. Moreover, many tax professionals exhibit a 
primordial view that laws and regulations provide the moral boundaries of what they do: 
provided they stay within the law, they are OK. In this respect, it is clear that a logic of tax 
minimisation persists in the minds of tax practitioners in spite of recent attempts to introduce 
alternative logics into the field of tax. However, this is not to say that moral logics have failed to 
gain any traction at all amongst tax practitioners. On the contrary, as we shall see below, there are 
emerging aspects of tax practice which suggest a more active embrace of moral concerns.  
 
2. Risk and ‘the effective tax rate’ 
Though some wedded themselves to a strictly legalistic view of corporate tax responsibilities, tax 
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professionals were increasingly likely to incorporate extra-contractual or extra-regulative views 
into their frames of reference.7 This illustrates how institutional actors are often forced to act in 
economically non-rational ways, embracing social rather than economic pressures (Suddaby, 
2013). For example, interviewees emphasised the need to be aware of public reactions to their 
activities, indicating a tension between legal tax minimization strategies and public perceptions 
concerning what is an appropriate amount of tax for a company to pay. This balancing act 
between different logics (commercial, regulatory and moral) is well encapsulated in the following 
quote: 
The million-dollar question is well what is the threshold? How much is that? Obviously, 
there is no right line. That is a subjective question. Obviously, the taxing jurisdictions are 
going to have a much higher standard than the companies themselves and it’s a matter of 
both parties coming together…I think there is a greater standard above and beyond ‘we 
are following the letter of the law’. (C24, Tax Executive, 2014) 
This interviewee outlines essentially three different positions regarding ‘appropriate tax levels’. 
There is the view of the company (encapsulating a commercial logic), the view of the taxing 
jurisdiction which is perceived as setting a higher threshold (encapsulating a regulatory logic) and 
also something vague that exists beyond the letter of the law (encapsulating a moral logic). This 
balancing act is not restricted to tax professionals from OECD countries either, as the following 
quote from a Big 4 tax accountant in China confirms: 
 
Because of BEPS clients have more and more uncertainty and they need to deal with 
lots of countries so we understand that aggressive tax planning is not…I would say 
it’s not valid anymore. So we also need to help our clients achieve certainty.  (P17, 
Tax Director, 2015) 
 
Essentially, the global nature of tax transactions means that even countries outside of the OECD’s 
remit are falling into line with the normative stance articulated by BEPS. This leaves tax 
                                                 
7 The interviews supported the majority of tax practitioners taking a legalistic 
interpretation of their corporate tax responsibilities, tempered by a moral perspective.  
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professionals, especially in-house professionals, to be the mediators (McPherson and Sauder, 
2013) or buffers (Barley, 1996) between their organisations and the wider public. Indeed, some 
tax professionals now saw their role as keeping their organization out of the newspapers: 
Starbucks was a good example. What they did from a tax perspective was all above board, 
it was fair and they used losses. There was nothing against the law there but the 
perception by the public was poor and it potentially made it difficult on sales, right. They 
are risking public perception, even though they were correct from a tax point of view. 
(C10, Tax Executive, 2014) 
 
This increasing sensitivity to public perceptions and expression of a need to “adopt practices 
assumed to be right or proper” (Suddaby, 2013: 381) over and above legal prescriptions was seen 
by many as a strategic necessity rather than a clear moral position per se. This was particularly 
true of consumer facing companies with well-known brands. Moreover, such views tended to be 
expressed more by in-house tax professionals than their external advisors, although advisors 
understood very clearly the needs of their clients to protect their reputations. Indeed, whenever 
external tax advisors would seemingly espouse a position that was beyond a ‘nexus as contracts’ 
view, this tended to be associated with their clients rather than themselves:  
I’ve never been part of a tax planning conversation in the last 4-5 years that didn’t involve 
economic substance, how is this going to be perceived, the newspaper test, and just the 
discussion about is this generally a responsible and substantive thing to do in addition to 
weighing the technical merit. So I’ve absolutely seen a shift (P30, Tax Partner, 2015) 
 
This tension between public perceptions and tax minimisation illustrates how moral imperatives 
actually represent an opportunity for in-house tax professionals to play a more prominent role in 
corporate decision making. They do so through the calculation of, and adherence to, what are 
referred to in the tax field as ‘effective tax rates’8. Persistent references were made by 
                                                 
8 In many cases, corporations start with the effective tax rate that they want to achieve, instead of structuring their tax 
affairs to achieve the lowest effective tax rate. Interviewees often referred to the importance of ensuring that their 
effective tax rates were within an industry range. 
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interviewees to an effective tax rate norm. This did not mean that a corporation should 
necessarily have a high effective tax rate but simply that the corporation’s rate should fall within 
a reasonable range consistent with an industry norm. For example, 
relative to other companies [in our industry] our effective tax rate is 16% and most other 
companies are between 16 and 20. That’s kind of the norm in Canada, based on the 
incentives that are there. So, you know, our tax rate isn’t 2%. It’s always been between 15 
and 20. (C13, Tax Executive, 2014) 
 
All the banks have a target range. If you checked all your conference calls they’ll have a 
target range and it may be 19 to 21 or 20 to 23 or 22 to 23 but they are always in that 
band. You don’t always get there but they are always generally in that band. (C3, Tax 
Executive, 2013) 
 
 
Working within industry wide accepted standards of behaviour vis-à-vis effective tax rates was 
seen by interviewees as a means of protecting their organisations from potential public 
backlashes, should some of their more byzantine tax arrangements ever come under scrutiny. 
Within these organizations, effective tax rates were, at times, framed as a form of risk tolerance 
or risk ‘appetite’, acting as a quantitative benchmark of what would appear to be seen as 
acceptable by revenue authorities (Power, 2009). Effective tax rates thus become an essential risk 
measurement tool. However, this was more common in consumer facing corporations and in 
public companies that needed to please shareholders. In contrast, business facing corporations 
and private companies placed much less concern on their effective tax rates. Instead, they 
emphasized regulatory notions of tax rules and placed greater importance on minimizing the 
amount of cash taxes payable.  
Exceptions such as these notwithstanding, in many cases it was clear that the heightened 
sensitivity around tax that characterizes the new moral order affords opportunities for reflexive 
tax accountants to position themselves more prominently in strategic corporate decision making.  
In two instances, we saw a very clear illustration of how this plays out at the local tax level and 
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this serves as something of an indicator as to how tax professionals as a whole, may see their role 
in a broader moral sense. For example, one interviewee expressed that there were times when tax 
professionals negotiated private agreements regarding property taxes and incentives but that there 
was some kind of quid pro quo by which the company agreed to contribute in some way to the 
social good of the local community.  The fact that these deals are private confers considerable 
power on the tax professional who serves as an arbiter of moral authority. Although we did not 
specifically observe this effect at the country level, public reports on the interactions between 
McDonalds and Luxembourg suggest that it is not unreasonable to imagine this behaviour may in 
some instances extend to the national level9. 
Processes of tax planning also operate in a highly isomorphic fashion as corporations look 
towards the tax behaviour of other corporations or simply see what seems to work, in tax 
terminology, “what sticks”. 
 
I would say even in my own practice where we do kind of push the boundaries a little bit, 
you know, you don’t go way overboard, right. You push it a little bit and you try and see 
if that sticks and if it does, that’s great but you don’t blow everything up for the sake of 
becoming greedy, if you will (C2, Tax Executive, 2014) 
 
Finally, in response to the uncertainties surrounding the assessment practices of tax authorities, 
we found a growing negotiated dimension in relations between taxpayers and tax authorities (see 
also Morrell & Tuck, 2014). This finding was somewhat unexpected since, unlike public 
relations, where norms would be expected to play a significant role, relations between taxpayers 
and tax authorities would be expected to be based predominantly or even exclusively on rules, 
laws and sanctions. Instead, there appears to be an increasing use by tax authorities of more 
                                                 
9 Kanter, J. EU Investigates McDonald’s Tax Deal with Luxembourg, New York Times (Dec 3, 
2015). https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/business/eu-opens-inquiry-into-possible-
mcdonalds-tax-breaks-in-luxembourg.html?_r=0 
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informal risk based mechanisms in an attempt to recoup more tax from what they see as powerful 
and ‘canny’ customers (Currie et al, 2015; Tuck, 2013). One initiative where this is evident is in 
risk based audit strategies that rank corporations based on a level of relative risk. The following 
interviewee describes how his organization has responded to this new ranking schema: 
Canada has adopted this risk-based audit approach now, where they basically rank tax 
payers based on a number of factors and, based on your ranking, they sort of set their 
audit scope and how they deal with you. We went through that process with our auditors 
and, you know, I think we were able to work with them and understand what factors they 
look at, what could we do different to lower our rating and they were actually open in 
communicating that. (C13, Tax Executive, 2014) 
 
In Canada, some interviewees commented on even more extreme approaches being taken by the 
CRA, including meeting directly with senior executives outside of the tax function and with 
boards in an attempt to shame those individuals over the corporation’s tax behaviour, although it 
is not clear whether this is having the desired effect:  
what we are talking about here with this transparency and these public discussions and 
even the CRA formal ‘let’s go and meet your directors’, I don’t get a sense other than 
angering tax executives it’s not having any impact on how we operate or how we operate 
within our company. (C4, Tax Executive, 2014) 
 
 
These new forms of cajolery by tax authorities appear to be a result of the failure of existing 
regulatory approaches, and the belief that corporations are not providing sufficient information 
regarding their activities. This is despite tax authorities having, at least in theory, complete and 
unfettered access to information.     
 Overall, in addition to new rules and regulations, tax practice is clearly also driven by 
moral imperatives that exceed the letter of the law. These moral imperatives have moved quicker 
than regulations have in many ways, and soft law initiatives such as BEPS should be viewed as 
an attempt to close the gap between the two. However, the complexity and difficulty of 
implementing regulation in this area still leaves significant room for manoeuvre for actors in the 
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field of tax practice. Indeed, while in one sense new moral demands are being placed upon 
corporations in terms of processes of risk management by adhering to things such as effective tax 
rates or risk audit strategies, in another sense wider public concerns that corporations pay their 
‘fair share’ of tax are viewed by tax advisors through the more mundane and soluble prism of 
reputational risk. In this respect, the commercial and moral logics that BEPS brings into potential 
conflict are effectively hybridized and made complementary by tax professionals. Thus, what 
appears to be a threat and potential disruptor to tax practice ends up recast as an opportunity for 
reflexive professionals.  
 
3. The rise of tax governance  
Further opportunities for professionals to capitalise on newly established moral logics in the tax 
field are evident in the way in which tax governance has emerged as a new practice category. 
Decisions about what is a ‘right amount’ of tax to pay or what is ‘acceptable’ in the context of 
public opinion cannot be made without recourse to the highly specialized knowledge base and 
shared meaning system that tax professionals as a whole are privy to. Our findings show that new 
elements are being introduced into the frames through which tax professionals have long 
understood their world. What is changing is how in-house tax professionals interact with senior 
executives such as the CEO and board members who don’t possess the “crucial know how” 
(Viale et al, 2017: 26) required to decipher tax problems. Some of the more significant actions 
under BEPS such as those concerning interest deductions and transfer pricing rest on highly 
technical points of understanding and interpretation that are beyond the knowledge of senior 
executives and board members. Consequently, tax consciousness is having to be diffused 
throughout organizations and in-house tax professionals are playing increasingly prominent roles 
in corporate decision making. For example, one tax partner in a Big 4 firm commented that  
31 
 
I’m hearing from a lot of VPs of tax that they’re asked to be at the board meetings 
whereas before they wouldn’t have been asked to be there.  (P30, Tax Partner, 2015) 
 
Another similarly noted: 
And I would say that I know of companies now that, part of their quarterly board 
meetings, involves more discussion with a tax department with regards to the type of 
transaction. (C26, Tax Consultant, 2014) 
 
We observed less of this effect in the private company setting, but this appeared more related to 
the fact that tax directors and CFOs already carried very significant authority with boards in those 
companies. 
On the specific issues that BEPS has introduced, such as country by country reporting, in-
house tax professionals are finding that they can no longer operate in relative isolation from the 
rest of the organization: 
 [country -by country reporting] is not something tax alone can do. This is an IT 
responsibility. So you need to have C-Suite involved to be able to get the projects 
approved and tax is not the only thing going on in organizations and so in terms of 
priority lists and timing like it’s got to get started now for large complex organizations to 
actually be able to do that. (P7, Tax Partner, 2014) 
 
 
As alluded to above, professionals at the government level also indicated that they are 
increasingly speaking to corporate boards rather than only to corporate tax departments about tax 
planning issues. However, this was explained to us as a function of tax departments putting up 
resistance to attempts to garner more information: 
We have companies that resist our every effort to get information, right, so we’ve 
elevated that discussion…because as you elevate within the organization you see more 
concern around them… They [boards] are happy to know, well for the most part, that their 
tax department is putting up resistance (G31, Director, 2016). 
 
In this respect, governmental bodies elevate the discussion to board level in order to bypass what 
they view as recalcitrant behaviour by corporate in-house tax professionals. This recalcitrance 
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can be interpreted as a skillful and reflexive (Suddaby et al., 2016) attempt to maintain opacity 
around the technical-cognitive resources that tax departments possess. However, circumventing 
tax professionals has the paradoxical effect of placing more power in their hands, as the 
complexity of tax practice is something that few board members have the cognitive expertise to 
adequately comprehend.  
I think the CRA seems to think that it’s the board will look at tax plans, they’ll look at tax 
transactions and they’ll never have the time to do that because they are just about high-
level governance. (C3, Tax Executive, 2013) 
 
Our interviews indicated that, to manage these interactions between in-house professionals and 
board members, more formal processes are being introduced to bridge knowledge gaps and 
meetings are occurring on a more regular basis. These processes include the formal adoption of 
‘risk management’ policies, attempts to educate senior management on the tax aspects of the 
business and approval processes over tax transactions. 
 
I would say the approval process has changed somewhat but it’s more formalized now to 
a point where we’ve actually adopted a tax risk management policy and we have a 
framework within which we work and we actually have approval thresholds and it’s all 
specified. So, you know, for any transaction over a hundred million we bring in one other 
person signing off on it and if it’s greater than that then it goes to the CFO and we go 
through it with him. So we do have a formal process. (C13, Tax Executive, 2014) 
 
 
Formal processes for managing risk in other domains have been shown to be associated with 
deeper failures in managerial intelligence (Power, 2009). This would appear to resonate with the 
proliferation of ‘tax risk management’ as a practice category that eludes adequate comprehension 
by the C-suite. As such, tax professionals within corporations and professional firms are 
designing their own procedures to mitigate risks, presenting themselves as indispensable. These 
changes are having a significant effect on how things are done, the organizing logics of tax 
professionals and the tax function within the organization. Tax professionals within organisations 
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are now having a much greater influence on corporate strategy than they ever were before. 
Simultaneously, in-house tax professionals at times employed risk to downplay their influence on 
corporate strategy and mitigate their responsibility. Interviewees mentioned a proliferation of risk 
mechanisms or filters, including approvals by Chief Risk Officers or risk committees or the need 
to fit within risk frameworks or risk codes before actions could be taken: 
 
I think I’d be responsible for explaining my assessment of the level of the risk to the 
organization. I think the decisions around whether to take those risks would be a 
combination of, depending on what it is, we have a Chief Risk Office. We have a CFO. 
The board has a Risk Committee who is responsible for managing risk. (C11, Tax 
Executive, 2013). 
 
It is unclear whether these mechanisms are actually successful in managing risks or are, as Power 
observes, “more about creating organizational rhythms of accountability and auditable 
representations of due process” (Power, 2009: 854). 
 While in-house tax professionals may point to these risk mechanisms, those advancing the 
‘tax risk management’ agenda are primarily accountants and lawyers who have a very specific 
skill set; the complexities of tax can only ever be understood by even sophisticated and highly 
intelligent executives to a limited extent.  
 
[O]ur particular audit committee has no accountants and nobody of any kind of tax 
background. If you have no tax background, no accounting background of significance, 
it's very difficult to ask informed questions or make informed statements. (C13, Tax 
Executive, 2015) 
 
While tax professionals spend time laying out a corporation’s tax plans to senior executives and 
boards, ultimately the decisions regarding tax planning fall back upon a limited number of 
individuals within the organization (see also Mulligan and Oats, 2016). Although big decisions, 
such as inversions or relocating headquarters, are still the preserve of corporate boards, to the 
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extent that the execution of these goes awry, lines of responsibility are drawn back to the tax 
department. This environment leads to a situation where overly aggressive behaviour will end up, 
not only in tax court and perhaps with regulatory sanctions, but also with broader moral 
judgements in the court of public opinion that could have much more serious consequences for 
the corporation. Put simply, in-house tax professionals may have lots of tools at their disposal, 
but they need to think long and hard before they put them to use.  
 
I’ve had a few internal discussions with people and it’s never bad to challenge yourself 
and say ‘are you comfortable now watching what’s going on? Are you comfortable in 
your skin that you are okay with what you are doing and as a fiduciary to your company, 
can you look your directors in the eye and say listen we really shouldn’t be worrying 
about this’ (C4, Tax Executive, 2014) 
 
 
In summary, tax professionals’ work has been disrupted in recent years by tax avoidance scandals 
and institutional initiatives such as BEPS. In-house tax professionals now find themselves 
shouldering the double burden of: interpreting complex tax legislation (harnessing their technical-
cognitive resources); and, making decisions in terms of what is a socially acceptable tax structure 
to engineer (responding to moral imperatives), receiving little in the way of guidance from 
corporate boards. This leads to a view of tax work as, firstly, technical to the point of 
impenetrability and, secondly, essentially moral in nature, as those who have putative decision 
making power in terms of aggressive tax planning or otherwise are almost completely reliant 
upon tax professionals to make those decisions for them. Therefore, morality is not just an 
outcome of tax work, tax is increasingly deeply imbued with it.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This study has sought to understand how changing public perceptions about taxation are, directly 
and indirectly, impacting tax practice. Our research conceived of tax as a social practice or, in 
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conceptual terms, as an institution underpinned by “collective cognitions and shared 
assumptions” (Suddaby, 2013: 381). The research also directly engaged tax actors. In particular, 
the fieldwork benefited from a high level of access to senior corporate tax practitioners and is 
recent; both of these attributes cause this study to be distinct from prior work.  
We found that participants felt that their professional domain was under intense pressure 
and that practice was changing as a result. Corporate tax is clearly an arena that has been subject 
to significant disruption in recent years. The OECD BEPS project has introduced multiple logics, 
or institutional complexity, to the field of tax. As one tax professional announced at a BEPS 
conference in 2015: ‘anyone who does not believe that BEPS is going to have a far-reaching 
impact has clearly been living on another planet for the last 5 years!’ Thus, even though the 
OECD itself does not have legal powers, national governments are expected to legislate in 
accordance with OECD guidance and a potential path from ‘soft’ law to ‘hard’ law is clear to see. 
What was already a complex arena has become less so in some ways, with greater regulatory 
precision and anticipated greater international harmonization, but actors are still left with 
significant space within which to manage and manipulate their professional environment 
(DiMaggio, 1991; Suddaby, 2013). Exploring how tax professionals have responded to this 
institutional flux permits us to make a number of contributions to our understanding of how 
professional projects develop during times of institutional change.   
 Firstly, our analysis shows how wider processes of institutional change at the field-level 
are connected to professionals repositioning themselves in the social space. Kodeih and 
Greenwood (2014) have shown that circumstances of institutional complexity provide 
organizations with the opportunity to enhance their status within surrounding fields. We show 
that professional groups/projects are afforded similar opportunities when largely exogenous 
shocks impact upon institutions. In this respect, professionals transform wider changes at the 
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organizational field level into resources that help advance professional projects (DiMaggio, 
1991). Heightened public awareness surrounding corporate tax contributions to national 
exchequers has fed through into corporate boardrooms in the form of increasing high-level 
scrutiny over tax planning. This has created opportunities for in-house tax professionals to play a 
more prominent role in corporate strategizing per se. Even where tax authorities seek to bypass 
corporate tax departments and go straight to corporate boards, this creates an opening for 
reflexive tax accountants with ‘entrepreneurial social skill’ (Suddaby et al., 2016) to enhance 
their prominence within the organization, as many corporate board members are perceived to be 
ill-equipped to deal with complex corporate tax issues without the aid of expert advice. The 
reflexivity that tax professionals exhibit here is more than ‘superficial’. ‘Superficial reflexivity’ is 
evident when actors exhibit only a technical awareness of the issues at play in surrounding fields 
(Suddaby et al, 2016). In the case presented above, tax professionals were all fully aware of the 
changing moral zeitgeist and the opportunities and constraints that this presented for them, both 
as individuals and as a professional group. In many ways, this throws into relief the weakness of 
soft law approaches to professional regulation. BEPS has a far-reaching intent to renegotiate the 
tax contract between corporations and society, but professional groups actively work, in various 
ways, to transform the BEPS agenda into a self-serving expansion of professional boundaries.   
 Secondly, we draw attention to the way in which different professionals are differentially 
affected by transnational institutional change, responding directly to Suddaby and Viale’s (2011) 
call for more research looking at how “field-level processes of institutionalization attend to some 
characteristics of individual professionals and not others” (431). In some respects, corporate in-
house tax professionals experience BEPS in a very different way from their external advisors in 
large accounting or law firms. Although all of these actors can be thought of as constitutive of the 
same professional tax project, internal divisions became clear when discussing the impact of 
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BEPS on tax planning. In this respect, the increased centrality of in-house tax professionals to 
corporate strategizing has not come without costs for these individuals, who were more likely to 
express despair at the demands that BEPS would place upon them and whether or not they would 
realistically be able to comply with those demands. In contrast, external tax advisors, although 
vexed by BEPS, were much more clinical in their response and focused on how their clients 
would need to adjust to meet BEPS; presumably this reflects the attendant opportunities that 
would emerge for them to advise clients on what has become an increasingly complicated area of 
practice. Further evidence of this can be seen in the significant attention the Big 4 firms have paid 
to BEPS and to keeping clients aware of BEPS developments10. In this respect, external tax 
advisors can be characterized as reflexive mediators, not merely between organizations and 
institutions (McPherson and Sauder, 2013), but between their corporate clients and society per se. 
Furthermore, that different types of tax professional are being heterogeneously impacted by 
BEPS was evident from the symbolic boundaries (Lamont, 1992) that were drawn between them. 
In-house tax professionals, many of whom had prior public accounting experience, could be quite 
critical of the major public accounting firms for having institutionalized aggressive tax planning 
practices in the first place which, in their eyes, have prompted regulators to take action through 
BEPS, constraining their discretion and placing upon them unreasonable demands. Thus, what is 
an opportunity for one professional faction can become, to some extent, a burden for the other. 
Although equally one could argue that the despair expressed over the burden of BEPS is a form 
                                                 
10 One example of this can be seen in KPMG’s “Understanding and preparing for BEPS” 
document, which states: “Knowledgeable and experienced professionals from KPMG LLP 
(KPMG) can work with you to help assess BEPS readiness, anticipate changes in the global tax 
landscape, proactively address your company’s global tax planning needs, and assist in 
developing an effective communication strategy to keep stakeholders informed of potential 
impacts to the company” (KPMG, 2015): http://www.kpmg-
institutes.com/content/dam/kpmg/taxwatch/pdf/2016/kpmg-beps-services-readiness.pdf 
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of ‘faux outrage’, masking the more strategic and reflexive manoeuvres that in-house actors 
evince elsewhere, such as in the corporate boardroom.  
 Thirdly, we draw attention to the different types of resources that professionals use in 
order to reposition themselves during times of institutional change. Seminal work in this area has 
usefully highlighted the importance of social capital (Suddaby and Viale, 2011) as well as skill 
(Fligstein, 2001), in enhancing professional projects. We show here the fundamental importance 
of technical-cognitive resources in professional repositioning. Technical-cognitive resources are 
evident in the form of the embodiment of highly complex tax knowledge, where tax professionals 
are seen as “holders of crucial know-how” (Viale et al., 2017: 26). The mechanics of tax planning 
in modern day corporations are so byzantine – partly a function of complicated regulation, partly 
a function of the complicated legal arrangements of corporations themselves – that most 
corporate board members struggle to meaningfully understand what it is that their own 
organization does vis-à-vis tax arrangements. Indeed, the consistent message that the tax 
profession has articulated about BEPS and increasing complexity, in both public fora and 
professional literature, could be seen as a signalling mechanism – a message sent to corporate 
boards that tax accountants and lawyers are even more indispensable to corporate decision 
making than they were hitherto. In this respect, not only do tax professionals have a valuable pool 
of technical-cognitive resources from which to draw, they skillfully put those resources to use. 
 Central to this increased importance of in-house tax professionals to the corporate 
decision-making process is risk management. Taxation has moved up the risk management 
hierarchy; no longer simply a cash cost of losing in tax court, taxation has become a critical 
variable in the organization’s reputational risk equation. While this new importance of tax risk 
within the organization has enhanced the status of tax professionals, it has also been employed by 
tax professionals to avoid or mitigate their responsibility with regards to such corporate decision 
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making. Tax professionals point to a plethora of risk management mechanisms, outside of their 
full control, through which decision making must flow. As BEPS has taken shape, tax risk has 
become increasingly diffused throughout the organization, with human resource or information 
technology departments having an ever-greater responsibility in determining permanent 
establishment or transfer pricing issues.     
In turn, this leads to a new understanding of tax, not merely as a practice that has moral 
implications, but as a practice that is more deeply imbued with morality than has hitherto been 
recognized. However, morality is not merely something that is thrust upon tax professionals as a 
whole, but something that is used skillfully as a symbolic resource by them with which to 
advance their own professional project. Specifically, moral and technical-cognitive elements 
combine in contemporary tax practice in ways which create both demands and opportunities for 
tax professionals. This combining of emerging norms and established technical expertise was 
evident in areas such as the measurement of - and strategic adherence to - effective tax rates, 
whereby the ‘socially acceptable’ is rendered calculable and knowable via recourse to 
professional expertise. Tax professionals have not been trained to think about what is right and 
wrong so much as what is within the letter of the law, yet they are now forced to deliberate on 
what kind of number or percentage might be considered socially acceptable. In this respect, 
norms become progressively inscribed into the technical-cognitive frames of tax professionals.  
Such attempts at bringing the socio-ethical into the technical realm are part of a wider 
proliferation of tax risk management discourse. ‘Tax risk management services’ have emerged in 
recent years as a response to the past excesses of tax professionals, external advisors specifically. 
In other words, solutions to the moral outrage engendered by the aggressive tax planning 
activities of large corporations are proffered by the very same actors who institutionalized 
aggressive tax planning in the first place. As Power (2009) notes, risk is one way to map ethical 
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limits (854). It is through the prism of risk, which is measured in a technocratic fashion and 
therefore rendered soluble, that in-house tax professionals have been disrupted in a technical-
cognitive sense, effectively being left to do the moralizing on behalf of senior corporate decision-
makers. For example, many of our interviewees were well aware of the impossibility of 
explaining to their clients or senior management what the organizational tax options were without 
biasing their decisions. It is in this respect – where the technical subsumes the ethical – that tax 
professionals should be considered as “morally significant actors” (Suddaby, 2013: 381). 
Understanding how tax professionals respond to institutional change and complexity is 
important because corporate tax has significant implications for wealth distribution and the 
capacity of the nation state to provide public services. Future research could look more closely at 
the socio-economic implications of state tax policy and the role of the tax profession in 
influencing that domain. Further studies could also usefully examine in more detail the process 
by which BEPS pronouncements have been made, paying particular attention to the way in which 
powerful professional actors might have influenced the agenda to their advantage from the outset. 
In the present paper, we have presented BEPS as something of an exogenous shock to the tax 
profession, albeit suggesting that tax professionals as a whole will have played some role in its 
development, but previous studies have shown how regulation is endogenized into professional 
projects (Bozanic et al, 2012; Mulligan and Oats, 2016). It may be that this is also the case here, 
and that tax professionals are not merely responding advantageously to external developments, 
but are much more deeply involved in shaping those external developments in the first place. 
This would be a question for a different study.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 The OECD BEPS Action Plan 
The Final BEPS reports were released in 2015. This appendix summarises the respective Actions, 
as outlined in the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit-Shifting Project: 2015 Final Reports 
Executive Summaries document. 
 
ACTION ITEMS ISSUE SUMMARY 
 
Action 1  
Digital Economy 
 
ADDRESSING THE 
TAX CHALLENGES 
OF THE DIGITAL 
ECONOMY 
Action 1 addresses the challenges that arise as a result of 
the digital economy. The report specifically notes that the 
digital economy cannot be ring-fenced from the broader 
economy from a tax standpoint and that the digital 
economy tends to exacerbate existing BPES challenges. 
The Action h considers both direct and indirect taxation. 
A subsequent report is expected by 2020.  
Action 2 Hybrids NEUTRALISING THE 
EFFECTS OF HYBRID 
MISMATCH 
ARRANGEMENTS 
Action 2 recommends rules that prevent taxpayers from 
using hybrid entities and instruments to artificially exploit 
differences in tax treatments between countries. Such 
activities are undesirable from an economic efficiency and 
fairness standpoint and potentially result in double non-
taxation. 
Action 3 
CFC Rules 
DESIGNING 
EFFECTIVE 
CONTROLLED 
FOREIGN COMPANY 
(CFC) RULES 
Action 3 sets out recommendations described as “building 
blocks” to strengthen controlled foreign company (CFC) 
rules and ensure that corporations do not shift income into 
foreign subsidiaries.  
Action 4 
Interest 
Deductions 
LIMITING BASE 
EROSION 
INVOLVING 
INTEREST 
DEDUCTIONS AND 
OTHER FINANCIAL 
PAYMENTS 
Action 4 explores best practices for ensuring taxpayers do 
not shift income via interest expense. The report notes 
that multinational groups have considerable potential to 
engage in base eroding actions by manipulating intra-
group financing arrangements  
 
Action 5 Harmful 
Tax Practices 
COUNTERING 
HARMFUL TAX 
PRACTICES MORE 
EFFECTIVELY, 
TAKING INTO 
ACCOUNT 
TRANSPARENCY 
Action 5 revamps the work on harmful tax practices. It 
focused heavily on transparency and ensuring there is 
substantial activity in preferential regimes. Some 43 
preferential regimes were reviewed.    
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AND SUBSTANCE 
Action 6 Treaty 
Abuse 
PREVENTING THE 
GRANTING OF 
TREATY BENEFITS 
INAPPROPRIATE 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
The Action 6 report notes that treaty shopping is one of 
the most critical elements of BEPS. The report is directed 
at preventing treaty abuse through mechanisms such as 
limitations on benefits provisions in tax treaties. 
 
Action 7 
Permanent 
Establishment 
Status 
PREVENTING THE 
ARTIFICIAL 
AVOIDANCE OF 
PERMANENT 
ESTABLISHMENT 
STATUS 
Action 7 addresses the definition of permanent 
establishment (PE) in order to prevent taxpayers from 
artificially circumventing PE status.  
Actions 8-10 
Transfer Pricing: 
Intangibles Risks 
& Capital High 
Risk Transactions 
ALIGNING 
TRANSFER PRICING 
OUTCOMES WITH 
VALUE CREATION 
 
Actions 8 – 10 address the concern that transfer pricing 
has been manipulated such that income allocation 
outcomes are misaligned with value creation activities. 
These Actions focus on intangibles, allocation of risk and 
other high risk areas. 
Action 11 BEPS 
Data Analysis 
MEASURING AND 
MONITORING BEPS  
Action 11 is focused on recommendations for collecting 
and analysing data on BEPS activity.  
Action 12 
Disclosure of 
Aggressive Tax 
Planning 
MANDATORY 
DISCLOSURE RULES 
Action 12 emphasises transparency and contains 
recommendations regarding mandatory disclosure rules. 
Action 13 
Transfer Pricing 
Documentation 
TRANSFER PRICING 
DOCUMENTATION 
AND COUNTRY-BY-
COUNTRY 
REPORTING 
Action 13 is directed at transfer pricing documentation. It 
includes a template for reporting income on a country-by-
country basis 
Action 14 Dispute 
Resolution 
MAKING DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 
MECHANISMS MORE 
EFFECTIVE 
Action 14 recognises that correcting base erosion should 
not result in double taxation of income. Accordingly, this 
Action is focused on ensuring effective mechanisms exist 
for resolving tax disputes between countries.   
Action 15 
Multilateral 
Instrument 
DEVELOPING A 
MULTILATERAL 
INSTRUMENT TO 
MODIFY BILATERAL 
TAX TREATIES 
Action 15 addresses the mechanics of implementing the 
BEPS proposal changes within the context of a multitude 
of bilateral tax treaties. Implementing the changes through 
one multilateral instruments enables the changes to be 
implemented rapidly and without waiting on the 
renegotiation of existing treaties.  
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APPENDIX 2 
 
KEY DATES AND EVENTS SURROUNDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF BEPS 
 
 
Key Dates 
 
Events Description 
2000 
 
Global Forum on 
Transparency and 
Exchange of Information 
for Tax Purposes 
 
Founded under the auspices of the OECD to 
address tax evasion, tax havens, offshore 
financial centres, tax information exchange 
agreements and double taxation. 
Restructured in 2009 to include non-OECD 
countries.   
 
2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 
 
Enacted as a reaction to corporate and 
accounting scandals such as Enron and 
Worldcom. Sought to create improved 
oversight, corporate responsibility, and 
enhanced disclosure and transparency   
 
2002 Forum on Tax 
Administration  
Established by the OECD’s Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs to encourage cooperation 
between revenue authorities and enhance tax 
administration practices. 
 
2006 
 
Third Meeting of the 
OECD Forum on Tax 
Administration – Seoul 
Declaration 
 
Highlighted the increasingly aggressive 
nature of corporate tax practices, and serious 
compliance and fairness issues. 
2007-2008 
 
Financial Crisis A crisis in the subprime mortgage market in 
the US led to a global international banking 
crisis that froze credit markets and resulted 
in a severe economic recession. Public anger 
was directed towards specifically the 
financial industry and more generally 
broader institutions in society. 
  
2011 Occupy Wall Street Global protest movement to direct attention 
to social and economic inequality, greed, 
corruption and the influence of corporations 
on governments. 
  
2012 G 20 Summit 
 
 
G20 reaffirms support for the work of the 
OECD to develop a framework to strengthen 
tax transparency and exchange of 
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information that eventually would become 
BEPS.    
 
2012-2013 UK Media reports 
surrounding Starbucks 
and investigations by the 
Commons public 
accounts committee 
Reuters publishes its “Special Report: How 
Starbucks avoids UK taxes” leading to 
questioning by the UK Public Accounts 
Committee of MNCs such as Starbucks, 
Amazon and Google over their UK tax 
activities and the publication of a report by 
the committee criticizing the HMRC 
allowing companies to pay little or no 
corporation tax. 
 
2013 OECD publishes BEPS 
Background Report and 
Action Plan 
  
The report notes that base erosion and profit 
shifting is major concern and risk to tax 
revenues, tax sovereignty and tax fairness. 
G20 has requested a report on the progress 
of the OECD’s work for February 2013. July 
2013 delivers OECD Action Plan to G20. 
 
2013 
 
G20 Summit G20 endorses OECD’s work to address cross 
border tax problems that under public 
finances and people’s trust in fairness of the 
tax system by changing rules to tackle tax 
avoidance, harmful tax practices, and 
aggressive tax planning. 
 
2015 OECD/ G20 publish 
Final Report and 15 
Action Items 
OECD and G20 countries agreed to a 
comprehensive package of measures 
including minimum standards in the areas of 
treaty shopping, Country-by-Country 
reporting, fighting harmful tax practices and 
improving dispute resolution to revision of 
existing standards in other areas. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Summary of Documents and Participant Observation 
 
 
Selection of 
Newspaper 
Articles 
Title Date Source 
 European commission to probe 
Amazon’s tax status in 
Luxembourg  
8, October 
2014 
The Guardian 
 Amazon to begin paying 
corporation tax on UK retail sales 
23, May 2015 The Guardian 
 ACCA research disputes corporate 
tax base erosion 
01, April 
2014 
Accountancy Age 
 Brussels to announce measures 
against corporations’ ‘sweetheart’ 
tax deals 
16, June 2015 The Guardian 
 Ireland to Scrap ‘Double Irish’ 
Tax Loophole  
14, October 
2014 
CFO.com 
 Irish to end the tax loophole that 
angered the regulators 
15, October 
2015 
International New York 
Times 
 Multinationals brace for tax 
overhaul 
16, April 
2014 
The Globe and Mail 
 UK to stymie EU plans to combat 
multinational tax avoidance 
26, June 2015 Accountancy Age 
 Walmart has $76 billion in 
overseas tax havens, report says. 
17, June 2015 The Globe and Mail 
 Starbucks and Fiat sweetheart tax 
deals with EU nations ruled 
unlawful 
21, October 
2015 
The Guardian 
 After Outcry, Ireland Adjusts Its 
Corporate Tax Draw 
16, November 
2015 
New York Times 
Tax Journal 
Articles 
Policy Forum: Editors’ 
Introduction – Addressing Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting 
2014 Canadian Tax Journal 
 Policy Forum: The Policy 
Underpinnings of the BEPS 
Project – Preserving the 
International Corporate Income 
Tax? 
2014 Canadian Tax Journal 
 Policy Forum: BEPS One Year In- 
Taking Stock 
2014 Canadian Tax Journal 
 Reputational Risk: A New 
Challenge in Transfer Pricing 
Compliance 
 
2013 
Tax Management 
International Journal 
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Studies and 
Conferences 
Responsible tax and BEPS – 
assessing the reaction among 
MNCS: Summary Global Survey 
Results 
May 2014 Deloitte 
 OECD’s BEPS initiative – 
multinational survey results 
September 
2014 
Deloitte 
 Deloitte OECD’s Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting (BEPS) 
initiative: Results of second 
annual multinational survey 
September 
2015 
Deloitte 
 Corporate tax evasion, avoidance, 
and competition: analyzing the 
issues and proposing solutions 
November 
2013 
Chartered Professional 
Accountants Canada 
 Co-operative Compliance: A 
Framework 
From Enhanced Relationship to 
Co-operative Compliance 
2013 OECD 
 EY Center for Board Matters: 
Board Matters Quarterly 
September 
2015 
Ernest & Young 
 Canadian Tax Foundation:  
BEPS Symposium: A Canadian 
Perspective 
January 2015, 
8 hours 
International Fiscal 
Association and 
Canadian Tax 
Foundation, Toronto, 
Canada 
 Deloitte-Waterloo Tax Conference June 2015,    
4 hours 
Deloitte and the 
University of Waterloo, 
Toronto, Canada 
 Oxford University Centre for 
Business Taxation: BEPS and UK 
tax policy: co-operation or 
competition?  
November 
2015, 8 hours 
Oxford University and 
OECD, London, UK 
 Canadian Tax Foundation:    
International Tax Planning for 
Canadians in a World of Changing 
Rules 
February 
2016, 8 hours 
Canadian Tax 
Foundation, Toronto, 
Canada 
 Oxford University Centre for 
Business Taxation: The Effects of 
Business Taxation on Economics 
and Social Welfare: New Insights 
from Tax Return Data 
 
March 2017, 
7 hours 
Oxford University, UK 
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TABLE 1 
 
Interviewees 
 
Unique 
Alpha-
Numerical 
Identifier 
Date Position Industry/ 
 Public Accounting 
Country Public or 
Private 
Size 
       
C1 January 2014 Tax Executive Industry Canada Public Large 
C2 January 2014 Tax Executive Industry Canada Private Large 
C3 November 2013 Tax Executive Industry Canada Public Large 
C4 January 2014 Tax Executive Industry Canada Public Large 
C5 February 2014 Tax Executive Industry Canada Public Large 
P6 September 2013 Tax Partner Public Accounting Canada Private Big 4 
P7 March 2014, 
August 2016 
Tax Partner Public Accounting Canada Private Big 4 
P8 March 2014 Tax Partner Public Accounting Canada Private Big 4 
P9 March 2014 Tax Partner Public Accounting Canada Private Big 4 
C10 March 2014 Tax Executive Industry Canada Public Medium 
C11 December 2013 Tax Executive Industry Canada Public Large 
C12 August 2015 Tax Executive Industry Canada Public Large 
C13 February 2014 Tax Executive Industry Canada Public Large 
C14 April 2015 Tax Executive Industry Canada/ US Public Large 
C15 July 2014 In-house Tax 
Counsel 
Industry UK/US Public Medium 
P16 August 2015 Tax Partner Public Accounting China  Private Big 4 
P17 August 2015 Tax Director Public Accounting China  Private Big 4 
P18 August 2015 Tax Senior 
Manager 
Public Accounting China  Private Big 4 
P19 August 2015 Tax Senior 
Manager 
Public Accounting China  Private Big 4 
C20 May 2014 Tax Executive Industry US Public Large 
P21 May 2014 Tax Partner Public Accounting US Private Regional 
C22 June 2014 Tax Executive Industry US Public Large 
C23 May 2014 CFO Industry US Private Small 
C24 May 2014 Tax Executive Industry US Private Large 
C25 May 2014 Tax Executive Industry US Public Public 
C26 May 2014 Tax Consultant Public Accounting US Private Small 
C27 July 2014 CFO Industry US Private Small 
C28 May 2014 Tax Executive Industry US Private Large 
C29 May 2014 Tax Executive Industry US Public Large 500 
P30 January 2015 Tax Partner Public Accounting US Private Big 4 
G31 November 2016 Director Government Canada Government Large 
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